A Tactical Look at the World Cup Final
by Tobias Escher and this blogger
[paraphrase translation and own reflections]
How did things play out in the 2014 World Cup Final in Rio de Janeiro at the legendary Estádio do Maracanã.
The blend of veteran and upstart was intriguing: One pairing: 33-year old Martín Demichelis started as a veteran defender for Argentina. Miroslav Klose, 36, started for Germany. The German striker participating in his fourth consecutive semi-final or final at World Cups. A man-of-steel achievement. But Demichelis had also survived the "downsizings" to his own surprise, making the 30- and 23-man cuts and eventually getting an upgrade to the starting 11 from the quarter-finals forward. Having been teammates at Bayern München from 2007 to 2010 made it unlikely that Klose and Demichelis would surprise each other.
[Tobias Escher]
Argentina was willing to let Germany dominate possession and the South Americans set up their two back lines of four defender/midfielders within their own area.
If the Germans hadn't been wary and tried only short passes in one area, leaving the ball in one place would have invited zone pressing and ultimate loss of the ball. Argentina was hoping for counter-attacks, lurking in hope of a mistake. But Germany kept switching sides on their attack (those trademark 35-yard blooping passes from one flank to the other) while tending to attack from Müller and Lahm's right side. This tactic kept the number of times the ball was lost near midfield to a minimum, and kept Argentina from mounting too many counterattacks.
Once Germany did give up possession, it was often at a point "geographically" the farthest away from where Lionel Messi was. The choice on the attack affects the other team's options. This tendency by Germany made it more time-consuming to "feed" Argentina's strong Messi side of the attack on its right.
In a nutshell, Germany kept thwarting a swarm zone defense - and in the Brazilian climate, that tactic made players tired for Argentina. And, if Argentina did regain possession, to make things go faster, they relied on long (hoofed) passes. These passes worked pretty well, even surprisingly so, but the defenders Höwedes, Schweinsteiger and Hummels kept taking turns (co)badgering Messi.
After half-time, the Argentinians switched Messi to the playmaker "10" position, with Sergio Agüero and Gonzalo Higuain as two strikers ahead of him. The Germans gradually responded to this system change, positioning André Schürrle wider, near the touchline to spread out Argentina's 3 midfielders, creating more space to attack the Gauchos. In a low-scoring or 0-0 game, the weak spots aren't noticed quite so soon. Schweinsteiger began to work the wings, orchestrating the German offense, leaving aside defensive responsibilities for others. Germany had mobile players shifting and funneling through - a winger would suck his defender out of an area where a key pass would occur. This was what happened a number of times as Germany tried to force a winning goal rather than wait out extra time for penalties. In the 113th minute, the tactic worked. Götze picked up a great cross snaked through two Argentina defenders covering Schürrle, the new "Super Mario" controlled the inbound pass with his chest and converted the left-footed volley with panache past the outstretched arms of Romero, an iconic goal.
[own analysis]
Funnily enough, when defending a Messi thrust into the German penalty area, Schweinsteiger also made a calculated risk to go over and try to block the pass coming only a few yards away from the goal line, as Argentina did against Schürrle from closer to the touch-line, but Schweinsteiger was never going to let that ball through to the surging Messi.
By contrast, Argentina's defenders let the ball through to Götze. Tired legs. Trophy won. But, to me, much glory must go to Jerome Boateng, who was Man of the Match and, in a finally tally, alongside Hummels, certainly better than Messi in the tournament overall.
But defenders are never singled out for commendation in formal terms - only goalies and strikers. It is the way of the world.
In summary, [Tobias Escher] Germany had an answer to the flow and style of play its opponent put on the pitch in every phase of the game. [own analysis now] Having said that, the tactic used by Argentina to hope to release Lionel Messi - if only one deadly time throughout 120 minutes - was fairly conservative. Why not get Sergio Agüero on the pitch sooner - a man who scored in 53 percent of the games he played at Man City? And had Germany not responded with its balanced but attacking style and fallen into a similarly guarded mode like Holland in the semi-final (how stultifying and uncreative), the final would have become plodding. Instead it became a shrewdly but absorbing game, with its protagonists really playing football and tackling and attacking in the air and on the ground for the planet's most coveted team sport trophy.
Based on http://www.welt.de/sport/fussball/wm-2014/article130122638/Deutschland-wankt-nach-Argentiniens-Systemwechsel.html
